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                        __________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
         The issue on appeal is whether a liability insurance 
policy's Sexually Transmitted Disease Exclusion excludes coverage 
for claims arising out of a gym member's expulsion from a gym due 
to his Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS").  Because we 
believe the Sexually Transmitted Disease Exclusion is ambiguous, 
we will vacate the district court's judgment that the exclusion 
does not bar coverage, and remand for the factfinder to consider 
extrinsic evidence on the exclusion's meaning. 
                          I.  Background 
         The plaintiffs, 12th Street Gym, Inc. ("Gym") and its 
co-owner and president, Robert Guzzardi, brought this action 
seeking a declaration of their rights under a liability insurance 
policy issued by the defendant, General Star Indemnity Company 
("General Star").  General Star is an excess and surplus lines 
insurer which provides third-party liability insurance to 
entities that cannot secure insurance through conventional 
commercial lines insurers. 
         The Gym and Guzzardi seek indemnification for the 
settlement of an underlying suit filed against them by Irving 
Silverman.  Silverman was a Gym member who had been diagnosed 
with AIDS in 1990.  Based on events that took place in the Gym's 
exercise facility in Philadelphia during February and March of 
1994, Silverman sued the Gym and Guzzardi in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
                                A. 
         On February 23, 1994, Silverman approached the Gym 
management with a suggestion for a special membership option for 
people diagnosed with AIDS.  After submitting his special 
membership proposal, Silverman was advised by a Gym employee that 
he would not be allowed to return to the Gym without a note from 
a doctor.  Silverman was permitted to enter the Gym when he 
returned several days later and presented a note from his doctor 
stating he was fit to exercise.  After exercising, Silverman 
nicked his finger on a gym locker.  He bandaged his cut with a 
band-aid given to him by a Gym employee, and then showered and 
dressed in the locker room. 
         According to Silverman, Guzzardi confronted him in the 
lobby as he was leaving and demanded to know whether he had AIDS. 
Guzzardi began yelling until Silverman publicly admitted he had 
AIDS.  After noticing the bandage on Silverman's finger, Guzzardi 
allegedly shouted:  "We don't want your kind in here.  You're 
careless!  You could infect everybody!"  Guzzardi demanded 
Silverman leave the gym and told him not to return. 
         In his complaint Silverman sought damages and 
declaratory and injunctive relief based on the Gym and Guzzardi's 
alleged discrimination in violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), intentional and negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, invasion of privacy, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and defamation. 
         At the time of the incidents alleged in Silverman's 
Complaint, the Gym and Guzzardi were named insureds under General 
Star's policy of general liability insurance, Policy No. IMA 
212509.  The policy had general provisions providing coverage for 
four different categories of harm: bodily injury, property 
damage, advertising injury and personal injury.  Attached to the 
policy was an endorsement that contained the following exclusion: 
         15.  Sexually Transmitted Disease Exclusions 
         (GSI-52-C200) 
 
         This insurance does not apply to "bodily 
         injury," "property damage," "personal 
         injury," "professional liability" or 
         "advertising injury" with respect to any 
         claim, suit or cause of action arising 
         directly or indirectly out of instances, 
         occurrences or allegations involving sexually 
         transmitted diseases, including Acquired 
         Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).  This 
         exclusion shall apply regardless of the legal 
         form any claim may take.  As an example, this 
         insurance shall provide no coverage for a 
         claim alleging that any Insured was negligent 
         or in breach of contract by maintaining 
         premises where the Insured knew, or should 
         have known, diseases might be sexually 
         transmitted. 
         The Gym and Guzzardi filed a claim for defense and 
indemnification of the Silverman suit under General Star's 
policy.  General Star declined to defend or indemnify the Gym and 
Guzzardi due, in part, to the Sexually Transmitted Disease 
Exclusion ("STDE").  On September 20, 1994, while Silverman's 
suit was pending, the Gym and Guzzardi instituted this suit in 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
against General Star.  In the complaint, the Gym and Guzzardi 
sought a declaration that General Star had a duty to defend 
against the Silverman suit, a duty to indemnify for any judgment 
entered against them in the Silverman suit, damages in excess of 
$50,000, and punitive damages. 
         On December 10, 1994, Silverman died, and his estate 
was substituted as plaintiff.  Subsequently the parties settled 
the Silverman suit for $35,000 and other nonmonetary relief.  The 
settlement agreement provided for a complete release of all 
claims against the Gym, Guzzardi and General Star.  General Star 
agreed to pay the defense costs incurred by the Gym and Guzzardi 
in litigating the underlying action.  General Star also advanced 
the cost of settlement to the Gym and Guzzardi, but reserved its 
right to contend it was not obligated to indemnify and therefore 
was entitled to repayment of the $35,000.  The Gym and Guzzardi 
agreed to drop all counts against General Star except for the 
claim that General Star had a duty to indemnify for the 
settlement.  By order entered January 31, 1995, the district 
court dismissed the Silverman suit. 
                                B. 
         The Gym and Guzzardi filed an Amended Complaint on 
February 6, 1995, alleging General Star had a duty to indemnify 
them for the Silverman suit liabilities.  In its Answer to the 
Amended Complaint, General Star set forth several affirmative 
defenses, including one based on the policy's Sexually 
Transmitted Disease Exclusion.  General Star also counterclaimed 
for a declaration that it had no duty to indemnify, and for 
judgment in the amount of $35,000 to reimburse it for the 
settlement cost. 
         The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  
By order entered June 22, 1995, the district court determined the 
STDE did not exclude coverage for the remaining claims in the 
Silverman suit and denied General Star's motion for summary 
judgment.  But the court also held General Star was not obligated 
to indemnify the Gym and Guzzardi for Silverman's ADA claim.  In 
addition, the court determined that the pre-trial settlement of 
the Silverman suit did not prevent General Star from contesting 
its obligation to indemnify the Gym and Guzzardi for the 
settlement of the Silverman action.  Finally, the district court 
found the facts were insufficiently developed to determine which 
counts of the underlying complaint, if any, gave rise to 
liability and coverage.  12th Street Gym, Inc. v. General Star 
Indem. Co., No. 94-5757, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 1995). 
         On September 6, 1995, the parties filed a stipulation 
in the district court under which General Star agreed to withdraw 
all affirmative defenses except for the defense based on the 
STDE.  The district court granted the Gym and Guzzardi's renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment based on this stipulation and on its 
previous holding that the STDE did not bar coverage for the 
Silverman suit.  12th Street Gym, Inc. v. General Star Indem. 
Co., No. 94-5757 (E.D. Pa. September 5, 1995). 
         General Star appeals the district court's determination 
that the STDE does not preclude indemnification for the Silverman 
suit.  The Gym and Guzzardi cross-appeal from the district 
court's holding that pre-trial settlement and dismissal of the 
underlying suit did not require General Star to indemnify for the 
Silverman settlement. 
                                C. 
         We have jurisdiction over the district court's final 
order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
of the district court's grant of summary judgment.  Oritani 
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635, 637 
(3d Cir. 1993).  The parties agree that Pennsylvania law governs 
this dispute.  The district court's application and 
interpretation of state law is subject to plenary review.  Salve 
Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991); Grimes v. 
Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1557 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 480 (1994).  Inquiry into the "legal 
operation" of an insurance policy is a conclusion of law and is 
also subject to plenary review.  Dickler v. CIGNA Property & 
Casualty Co., 957 F.2d 1088, 1094 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Linder 
v. Inhalation Therapy Services, Inc., 834 F.2d 306, 310 (3d Cir. 
1987) (citing Cooper Labs. Inc. v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 
802 F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding judicial construction 
of an insurance policy to account for events not foreseen by the 
parties is subject to plenary review)). 
 
                         II.  Discussion 
                      A.  Duty to Indemnify 
         General Star is not obligated to indemnify the Gym and 
Guzzardi for claims that fall outside the general scope of the 
insurance policy.  Accordingly, before we examine the meaning of 
the STDE, we must determine whether each of Silverman's claims is 
potentially covered under a reasonable interpretation of the 
policy. 
         As we have noted, Silverman alleged seven claims in his 
first amended complaint: (1) discrimination in violation of the 
ADA; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) 
negligent infliction of emotional distress; (4) invasion of 
privacy; (5) fraudulent misrepresentation; (6) civil conspiracy; 
and (7) defamation.  The district court determined General Star 
is not obligated to indemnify the Gym and Guzzardi for the ADA 
claim, and this holding has not been appealed.  12th Street Gym, 
Inc. v. General Star Indem. Co., No. 94-5757, slip op. at 2 (E.D. 
Pa. June 22, 1995). 
         The insurance policy provides coverage for four 
categories of harm: bodily injury, property damage, advertising 
injury, and personal injury.  Neither party suggests that 
Silverman's remaining claims pertain to "bodily injury" or 
"property damage" as those terms are defined in the policy.  
Moreover, our review of the policy confirms these claims do not 
allege harm that could be considered a part of either category.  
Thus, Silverman's claims are only covered to the extent they 
allege either "advertising injury" or "personal injury." 
         The Gym and Guzzardi suggest some or all of Silverman's 
claims could be considered "advertising injury."  The policy 
defines "advertising injury" in part as injury arising out of: 
         a.  Oral or written publication of material 
         that slanders or libels a person or 
         organization or disparages a person's or 
         organization's goods, products or services; 
 
         b.  Oral or written publication of material 
         that violates a person's right to privacy . . 
         . . 
But there is a limiting definition of "advertising injury."  A 
separate section of the policy states it covers only: 
         "[a]dvertising injury" caused by an offense 
         committed in the course of advertising your 
         goods, products or services . . . . 
None of Silverman's claims were for injury caused by an offense 
committed in the course of advertising goods, products or 
services.  Since the parties do not contend Silverman's 
allegations were in any way related in an advertisement, the 
clear terms of the policy preclude characterizing his claims as 
"advertising injury." 
         The remaining category of harm, "personal injury," is 
defined in the part as: 
         injury, other than "bodily injury," arising 
         out of one or more of the following offenses: 
 
         . . . 
 
              d.  Oral or written publication of 
              material that slanders or libels a 
              person or organization or disparages a 
              person's or organization's goods, 
              products, or services; or 
 
              e.  Oral or written publication of 
              material that violates a person's right 
              of privacy. 
(Emphasis added).  The body of the policy provides the insurance 
applies to all: 
         "[p]ersonal injury" caused by an offense 
         arising out of your business, excluding 
         advertising, publishing, broadcasting or 
         telecasting done by or for you . . . . 
         Slander and libel are both forms of defamation; slander 
is defamation by words spoken, and libel is defamation by written 
or printed material.  Sobel v. Wingard, 531 A.2d 520 (Pa. Super. 
1987) (citing Solosko v. Paxton, 119 A.2d 230 (Pa. 1956), and 
Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 273 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1971)).  In 
Pennsylvania, "a statement is defamatory if it tends to harm an 
individual's reputation so as to lower him in the estimation of 
the community or deter third persons from associating or dealing 
with him."  Kryeski v. Schott Glass Technologies, 626 A.2d 595, 
600 (Pa. Super. 1993) (quoting Zartman v. Lehigh County Humane 
Soc., 482 A.2d 266, 268 (Pa. Super. 1984)), appeal denied, 639 
A.2d 29 (1994); see also U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross of Greater 
Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 923 (3d Cir.) (citing Birl v. Philadelphia 
Elec. Co., 167 A.2d 472 (Pa. 1960)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816 
(1990).  The court makes the initial determination of whether the 
statement at issue is capable of defamatory meaning.  U.S. 
Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 923 (citing Corabi, 273 A.2d at 904). 
         We think that Silverman's claims for intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, 
civil conspiracy and defamation all state potential claims for 
"personal injury."  All of these claims arose from Guzzardi's 
accusation that Silverman was "careless" and that "his kind" was 
not wanted at the Gym.  These statements tended to harm 
Silverman's reputation and deter third persons from associating 
or dealing with him.  In addition, Guzzardi's actions may have 
violated Silverman's right to privacy.  To the extent 
Silverman's claims allege injuries arising out of the Gym or 
Guzzardi's slander or publication of material that violated 
Silverman's right to privacy, the Gym and Guzzardi may be 
entitled to indemnification for the settlement amount paid to 
Silverman's estate. 
         The district court held the underlying complaint was 
"based on Irving Silverman's alleged exclusion from the 12th 
Street Gym -- not on his purportedly having a sexually 
transmissible disease."  12th Street Gym, Inc. v. General Star 
Indem. Co., No. 94-5757, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 1995) 
(citing First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 8-35).  Although the 
district court's characterization of the complaint is feasible, 
it is misleading for the purposes of this case.  The Gym and 
Guzzardi are only entitled to indemnification to the extent 
Silverman's claims can be considered "personal injury."  
Exclusion from the Gym, without more, cannot reasonably be 
construed as slander, invasion of a right to privacy, or any 
other form of "personal injury" as it is defined in the policy. 
         On the other hand, the court was correct to point out 
that Silverman's complaint was not based on his "purportedly 
having a sexually transmitted disease."  Careful review of the 
complaint reveals that Silverman's allegations were based on the 
allegation that he had AIDS, without reference to the manner in 
which he contracted the disease.  Since AIDS can be transmitted 
in a number of ways, only one of which is sexual, it is not 
accurate to say Silverman's complaint was based on his having a 
"sexually transmitted" disease.  Thus while we reject the 
district court's conclusion that the underlying complaint was 
based solely on Silverman's exclusion from the Gym, we adopt the 
court's alternative determination that "to the extent AIDS was 
implicated, it was not as a sexually transmissible disease."  
12th Street Gym, Inc. v. General Star Indem. Co., No. 94-5757, 
slip op. at 1-2 (E.D. Pa. September 5, 1995). 
         We now turn to the STDE to examine the extent to which 
Silverman's claims for "personal injury" may be excluded from 
coverage by the STDE. 
                             B.  STDE 
                                1. 
         On appeal, General Star argues the STDE unambiguously 
precludes coverage for the Silverman claims.  As we have noted, 
the STDE precludes coverage for claims: 
         arising directly or indirectly out of 
         instances, occurrences or allegations 
         involving sexually transmitted diseases, 
         including Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
         (AIDS). 
According to General Star, the district court erred in holding 
this language is limited to "transmittal of the disease."  
General Star contends the STDE bars coverage for all claims 
presented in the Silverman suit because Silverman's disease was 
so central and integral to the alleged actions of the Gym and 
Guzzardi that, but for the disease, Silverman would not have a 
claim. 
         Emphasizing the extensive scope of the phrase "arising 
directly or indirectly from," General Star claims it means 
something broader than normal proximate or substantial factor 
causation and suggests that "but for" causation is sufficient to 
trigger the exclusion.  Furthermore, the word "involving" 
evidences the parties' intent to give the exclusion a broad, all 
encompassing range.  General Star maintains the language of the 
STDE is comprehensive and applies to all claims "remotely 
related" to a sexually transmitted disease, regardless of nature 
or scope. 
         In contrast, the Gym and Guzzardi examine the same 
provision and conclude the STDE was intended to exclude only 
those claims which allege contraction, exposure, or fear of 
exposure to sexually transmitted diseases.  They argue the mere 
existence of a disease that can be sexually transmitted, 
particularly one that may not have been contracted through sexual 
activity, is not sufficient to trigger the exclusion.  Instead, 
the Gym and Guzzardi contend, the exclusion was only intended to 
prohibit coverage of claims alleging conduct related to sexually 
transmitted diseases. 
         In support of this argument, the Gym and Guzzardi cite 
the following language in the STDE: 
         This exclusion shall apply regardless of the 
         legal form any claim may take.  As an 
         example, this insurance shall provide no 
         coverage for a claim alleging that any 
         Insured was negligent or in breach of 
         contract by maintaining premises where the 
         Insured knew, or should have known, diseases 
         might be sexually transmitted. 
The Gym and Guzzardi claim this example indicates the parties' 
intent to exclude from coverage only claims alleging the 
transmission of diseases through sexual activity.  Because 
Silverman's claims were premised only on the existence of AIDS, 
and not transmission or exposure to the disease, they maintain 
the claims should not be excluded from insurance coverage. 
         In summary, each party examines the language of the 
STDE and draws opposite conclusions regarding the "clear and 
unambiguous" language of the provision. 
                                2. 
         Under Pennsylvania law, a court, rather than a jury, 
generally interprets the language of an insurance contract.  
Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins., Co., 469 
A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983) (citing Gonzalez v. United States Steel 
Corp., 398 A.2d 1378 (Pa. 1979) (holding "the common law has long 
thought it best to leave to the court rather than to the jury the 
essentially factual question of what the contracting parties 
intended.") (quotations omitted)).  The goal of insurance 
contract interpretation is to "ascertain the intent of the 
parties as manifested by the language of the policy."  Visiting 
Nurse Ass'n v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 65 F.3d 1097, 1100 
(3d Cir. 1995).  Where the language of an insurance policy is 
clear and unambiguous, it must be given its plain and ordinary 
meaning.  Id. (citing Pennsylvania Mfr. Ass'n Ins. Co. v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Ins. Co., 233 A.2d 548, 551 (Pa. 1967)). 
         After reviewing the language of the policy, we believe 
the STDE is ambiguous.  Whether an ambiguity exists is a question 
of law.  Kiewit Eastern Co. v. L & R Constr. Co., 44 F.3d 1194, 
1199 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 
A.2d 385, 390 (Pa. 1986)).  Disagreement between the parties over 
the proper interpretation of a contract does not necessarily mean 
that a contract is ambiguous.  Vogel v. Berkley, 511 A.2d 878, 
881 (Pa. Super. 1986).  But a contract is ambiguous "if it is 
reasonably susceptible of different constructions and capable of 
being understood in more than one sense."  Steele v. Statesman 
Ins. Co., 607 A.2D 742, 743 (Pa. 1992). 
         In this case, the STDE is reasonably susceptible to 
more than one interpretation.  First, it is difficult to 
determine from the contract language alone the parties' intended 
meaning of the term "sexually transmitted disease."  The term is 
not defined in the policy.  It could reasonably be understood to 
encompass all diseases that could conceivably be sexually 
transmitted, or it could be limited to diseases that have 
actually been transmitted through sexual conduct. 
         Moreover, the language of the STDE does not indicate 
the intended scope of the exclusion.  The STDE could reasonably 
be understood to exclude from coverage all claims arising 
indirectly out of allegations involving the existence of a 
sexually transmitted disease.  Support for this interpretation 
comes from the first sentence of the STDE, which provides in 
part, 
         [t]his insurance does not apply to . . . 
         "personal injury" . . . with respect to any 
         claim . . . arising directly or indirectly 
         out of instances, occurrences or allegations 
         involving sexually transmitted diseases . . . 
         . 
(emphasis added).  As we have noted, the definition of "personal 
injury" includes injury arising out of: 
         oral or written publication of material that 
         slanders or libels a person's or 
         organization's goods, products, or services; 
         or . . . oral or written publication of 
         material that violates a person's right to 
         privacy . . . . 
This definition suggests the mere existence of (and reference to) 
a sexually transmitted disease in an oral or written publication 
might establish a "personal injury" that is excluded from 
coverage. 
         But at least an equally reasonable interpretation of 
the STDE would limit the exclusion to claims alleging 
transmission, or fear of transmission, of disease through sexual 
conduct.  Thus "personal" injury may be limited to allegations of 
actual sexual conduct in an oral or written publication.  
Moreover, the "mere existence" interpretation of the STDE would 
virtually eliminate coverage for an extremely broad set of 
claims.  For example, this interpretation might exclude coverage 
for injuries sustained in a fall caused in part by the weakened 
physical condition of a person with AIDS.  The wide range of 
claims excluded by the "mere existence" interpretation tends to 
undermine its validity.  Hence, both the "mere existence" and the 
"conduct or exposure" interpretations have some basis in the text 
of the policy. 
         More importantly, the language of the STDE does not 
clearly reveal the required nexus between a claim and a sexually 
transmitted disease.  General Star argues the STDE applies to all 
claims which are even "remotely" related to incidents, 
occurrences or allegations involving a sexually transmitted 
disease.  But they also contend the exclusion does not apply if 
the claim has only an "incidental" or "irrelevant" connection to 
a sexually transmitted disease.  As we have noted, the district 
court held, "[t]he underlying complaint is based on Irving 
Silverman's alleged exclusion from the 12th Street Gym -- not on 
his purportedly having a sexually transmissible disease."  
Alternatively, the district court found "to the extent AIDS was 
implicated, it was not as a sexually transmissible disease."  
12th Street Gym, Inc. v. General Star Indemnity Co., No. 94-5757, 
slip op. at 1-2 (E.D. Pa. September 5, 1995).  Thus the 
distinction between a "remote" connection and an "incidental" 
connection to a sexually transmitted disease may be significant 
in this case. 
                                3.      
         The Gym and Guzzardi contend the ambiguous language in 
the STDE should be construed against General Star.  See, e.g., 
Standard Venetian Blind Co., 469 A.2d at 566 (where the language 
is ambiguous, "the policy provision is to be construed in favor 
of the insured and against the insurer, the drafter of the 
agreement").  But a court will only construe ambiguous language 
against the drafter in the absence of relevant extrinsic 
evidence.  Hutchison, 519 A.2d at 390-91 n.5.  Under Pennsylvania 
law, a court determines as a matter of law whether there is an 
ambiguity.  If so, the factfinder shall resolve the ambiguity.  
Id. at 390, 391 n.6; see also Peerless Dyeing Co. v. Industrial 
Risk Insurers, 573 A.2d 541 (Pa. Super. 1990) ("it is the duty of 
the court to interpret an unambiguous [insurance policy] 
provision while interpretation of ambiguous clauses may properly 
be left to a jury") (emphasis in original), appeal denied, 592 
A.2d 1303 (1991). 
         At this stage, the only available extrinsic evidence is 
an affidavit from the president of the company that underwrote 
the insurance policy.  The affidavit was submitted by General 
Star with its Motion for Summary Judgment and states "it was the 
underwriter's intention to exclude from coverage claims such as 
those which are stated in [Silverman's complaint] . . . ."  But 
the affidavit also states "it was not [the underwriter's] 
intention . . . to exclude coverage for claims in which the 
involvement of a sexually transmitted disease was irrelevant or 
purely incidental to the claim . . . ."  In view of this, we do 
not believe the available extrinsic evidence here is sufficient 
to resolve the ambiguities in the STDE.  Accordingly, we will 
remand this matter to the district court. 
                C.  Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Linn 
         On the cross-appeal, the Gym and Guzzardi argue the 
district court erred in denying summary judgment on their claim 
that the pre-trial settlement and dismissal of the Silverman suit 
required, as a matter of law, a finding that General Star has a 
duty to indemnify them for the cost of settling the Silverman 
suit.  The Gym and Guzzardi argue that, under our holding in 
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1985), 
General Star has a duty to indemnify because the Silverman suit 
was dismissed before Silverman's claims could be confined to 
those outside the scope of policy coverage.  The district court 
rejected this argument finding the present case distinguishable 
from Linn and analogous to Cooper Labs., Inc. v. Int'l Surplus 
Lines Ins. Co., 802 F.2d 667, 674 n.1 (3d Cir. 1986), and 
Safeguard Scientifics, Inc. v. Centercore, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 
324, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 961 F.2d 209 
(3d Cir. 1992) (Table). 
         In Linn, Pacific Indemnity brought a declaratory 
judgment action to determine which of several insurers had a duty 
to defend and indemnify Dr. Linn in suits against him to recover 
for injuries or death suffered by persons who had read and 
followed his diet book.  Several of the suits against Dr. Linn 
were settled by the insurance companies before sufficient facts 
were developed to determine the basis for Dr. Linn's liability.  
Consequently, it was impossible to determine whether the policies 
provided coverage for the settlement amount.  Because we could 
not determine which of the injured bookreaders claims would have 
prevailed, we held "the duty to defend carries with it the 
conditional obligation to indemnify until it becomes clear that 
there can be no recovery within the insuring clause."  Id. at 
766.  We observed: 
         [t]o reach the opposite conclusion could 
         conceivably result in an insured never being 
         indemnified in a suit that its insurer 
         settles where that insurer defends under a 
         reservation of rights.  In such a situation, 
         it would behoove the insurer to reserve its 
         rights and to settle the suit to avoid both 
         the costs of litigation and, at the same 
         time, the costs of indemnification. 
Id. at 766.  Thus our holding was based, in part, on the concern 
that an insurer would be able to settle a suit without an 
agreement with the insured, and attempt to avoid its duty to 
indemnify by claiming a jury would have found the claims in the 
underlying suit were not covered by the policy. 
         The Gym and Guzzardi argue Linn is analogous to this 
case because the Silverman suit was settled before the claims 
were confined to those outside of the scope of the policy.  But 
unlike the insured in Linn, the Gym and Guzzardi participated  
and acquiesced in the settlement of the underlying case.  Because 
the Gym and Guzzardi were not exposed to the risk that influenced 
the Linn decision, the district court correctly denied their 
motion for summary judgment.  See Cooper Labs., Inc. v. Int'l 
Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 802 F.2d at 674 (holding the Linnduty to 
indemnify rule did not apply to a case settled by the 
insured) (applying New Jersey law); Safeguard Scientifics, Inc. 
v. Centercore, Inc., 766 F. Supp. at 334 (same). 
                         III.  Conclusion 
         We will vacate the district court's order granting the 
Gym and Guzzardi's motion for summary judgment.  We will remand 
the matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.                         
 
                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
12TH STREET GYM, INC. v. GENERAL STAR INDEMNITY CO., ET AL 
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Roth, Circuit Judge: 
         The issue in this appeal is the proper interpretation 
of a Sexually Transmitted Disease Exclusion ("STDE") included in 
a liability insurance policy.  As I read the broadly-worded STDE, 
it unambiguously excludes from coverage all of the claims in 
Irving Silverman's Complaint for which the insured, 12th Street 
Gym ("Gym"), could possibly have been indemnified.  I therefore 
believe that the Gym is not entitled to indemnity for the 
settlement of any of Silverman's claims.  Accordingly, I dissent.  
I would reverse the district court's entry of summary judgment 
for the Gym and its co-owner and president, Robert Guzzardi, and 
enter summary judgment for the insurer, General Star Indemnity 
Company. 
         As the majority has explained, Silverman's complaint is 
based on an incident that took place in the Gym lobby in 1994.  
After Silverman finished exercising, he nicked his finger on a 
gym locker.  He bandaged his cut with a band-aid, showered, and 
dressed in the locker room.  Silverman alleges that as he was 
leaving the Gym, he was confronted by Guzzardi.  In front of 
other Gym patrons, Guzzardi demanded to know whether Silverman 
had AIDS, and Silverman affirmed that he did.  Noticing the 
bandage on Silverman's finger, Guzzardi allegedly shouted, "We 
don't want your kind in here.  You're careless!  You could infect 
everybody!"  Silverman was thereafter banned from the Gym. 
 
         The majority notes that under the insurance policy the 
Gym would be entitled to indemnity in this case only to the 
extent that Silverman's claims could be characterized as 
"personal injury."  Thus, the Gym is entitled to indemnity from 
General Star only to the extent that Silverman suffered damages 
as a result of the Gym's slander or the Gym's publication of 
material that violated Silverman's right to privacy.  I therefore 
agree with the majority that one of the district court's 
alternative holdings is flawed. 
         The district court held that the STDE did not preclude 
indemnity for Silverman's claims because "[t]he underlying 
Complaint is based on Irving Silverman's alleged exclusion from 
the 12th Street Gym -- not on his purportedly having a sexually 
transmissible disease."  12th Street Gym, Inc. v. General Star 
Indem. Co., No. 94-5757 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 1995).  If Silverman's 
claims were based on his exclusion from the 12th Street Gym 
alone, however, those claims would not be covered under the 
insurance policy at all.  As the majority demonstrates, the only 
potentially relevant coverage is for "personal injury," and 
personal injury, by definition, involves defamation or invasion 
of privacy, not physical exclusion from the Gym.  Given the 
relevant insurance coverage, General Star could not possibly be 
required to indemnify the Gym for claims based only on 
Silverman's exclusion from the Gym.  Because such a claim would 
not be covered by the insurance policy to begin with, we need not 
consider whether it is excluded from coverage by the STDE. 
         It is in our consideration of the district court's 
alternative holding that the majority and I part ways.  The 
district court held that the STDE does not preclude coverage in 
this case because Silverman's complaint was not based on his 
"purportedly having a sexually transmitted disease."  The 
assumption underlying this holding is that the STDE can be read 
narrowly to exclude from coverage only those claims that allege 
transmission of a disease through actual sexual conduct, as 
opposed to excluding from coverage all claims involving the genre 
of diseases known generally as sexually transmitted diseases (no 
matter how the disease was transmitted in a particular instance).  
I believe that this reading of the STDE is insupportably narrow 
when read against the exclusion's broad language. 
         The majority divides its support for this holding into 
three separate but closely related arguments.  First, the 
majority makes a textual argument.  In essence, the majority 
argues that the term "sexually transmitted disease" is inherently 
ambiguous because it is unclear whether it refers generally to 
the genre of diseases that may be sexually transmitted or only to 
diseases that were transmitted by sexual conduct in the 
particular case at hand.  Second, the majority argues that the 
STDE fails to indicate the intended scope of the exclusion.  
Third, the majority argues that the STDE does not reveal the 
required nexus between a claim and a sexually transmitted 
disease.  I will address these arguments in turn. 
         Before specifically addressing the majority's 
arguments, however, I believe that the broad language of the STDE 
bears repeating in its entirety: 
         This insurance does not apply to "bodily injury," 
         "property damage," "personal injury," "professional 
         liability" or "advertising injury" with respect to any 
         claim, suit or cause of action arising directly or 
         indirectly out of instances, occurrences or allegations 
         involving sexually transmitted diseases, including 
         Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).  This 
         exclusion shall apply regardless of the legal form any 
         claim may take.  As an example, this insurance shall 
         provide no coverage for a claim alleging that any 
         Insured was negligent or in breach of contract by 
         maintaining premises where the Insured knew, or should 
         have known diseases might be sexually transmitted. 
App. at 166a.  Thus this extremely broad exclusion precludes 
indemnification for any claim for "personal injury," even if the 
injury arose only indirectly from an occurrence or allegation 
involving sexually transmitted diseases, such as AIDS. 
         The majority relies heavily on a narrowly-focused 
textual argument in order to avoid the broad sweep of the STDE.  
According to the majority, this case may not "involve" a sexually 
transmitted disease at all because: 
         [c]areful review of the complaint reveals that 
         Silverman's allegations were based on the allegation 
         that he had AIDS, without reference to the manner in 
         which he contracted the disease.  Since AIDS can be 
         transmitted in a number of ways, only one of which is 
         sexual, it is not accurate to say Silverman's complaint 
         was based on his having a "sexually transmitted" 
         disease.  Thus . . . we adopt the [district] court's 
         alternative determination that "to the extent AIDS was 
         implicated, it was not as a sexually transmissible 
         disease." 
Slip op. at    [Typescript at 13] (quoting district court 
opinion).  The majority reemphasizes this argument later by 
stating that the term "sexually transmitted disease" could be 
understood to "encompass all diseases that could conceivably be 
sexually transmitted, or it could be limited to diseases that 
have actually been transmitted through sexual conduct."  Id. at    
[Typescript at 16]. 
         The majority's reading of the term "sexually 
transmitted disease" is unconvincing, given the common usage of 
that term.  Words of common usage in an insurance policy must be 
construed in their natural, plain and ordinary sense, Slate 
Construction Co. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 228 Pa. Super. 1, 
323 A.2d 141, 145 (1974) (citing Blue Anchor Overall Co. v. 
Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co., 385 Pa. 394, 123 A.2d 
413 (1956)), and we should not torture the plain meaning of a 
writing merely to find an ambiguity.  Monti v. Rockwood Ins. Co., 
303 Pa. Super. 473, 450 A.2d 24 (1982); see Techalloy Co., Inc. 
v. Reliance Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1, 487 A.2d 820 (1984). 
         In common usage, the term "sexually transmitted 
disease" refers to a genre of communicable diseases, no matter 
how they are actually transmitted in an individual case (e.g., 
AIDS is a "sexually transmitted disease," even though it may be 
transmitted through blood transfusions or the use of contaminated 
hypodermic needles).  Nothing in the context of the STDE 
indicates that the designation "sexually transmitted disease" 
should be read to require the occurrence of actual sexual 
transmission or sexual conduct in each individual case. 
         An interpretation of the term "sexually transmitted 
disease" as referring to a genre of diseases as opposed to a 
singular mode of transmission in an individual case is reinforced 
by the inclusion of an example of such sexually transmitted 
diseases at the end of the relevant sentence in the STDE:  
"involving sexually transmitted diseases, including Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)" (emphasis added).  In other 
words, the STDE excludes from coverage any claim arising out of 
instances or allegations involving the genre of diseases known as 
sexually transmitted diseases, which includes the disease known 
as AIDS. 
         Contrary to the majority's emphasis on actual sexual 
conduct, the STDE uses sweeping language to exclude from coverage 
a broad swath of claims "arising directly or indirectly out of 
instances, occurrences or allegations involving sexually 
transmitted diseases . . .."  There is no reference to conduct or 
sexual conduct anywhere in the STDE.  The majority's reading of 
the term "sexually transmitted disease" to emphasize transmission 
by sexual conduct is strained on its face, given the accepted 
meaning of that term.  In the context of the entire STDE, the 
majority's reading is untenable. 
         The majority also argues that the scope of the STDE is 
unclear.  According to the majority it would be reasonable to 
limit the STDE "to claims alleging transmission, or fear of 
transmission, of disease through sexual conduct.  Thus 'personal' 
injury may be limited to allegations of actual sexual conduct in 
an oral or written publication."  Slip op. at    [Typescript at 
17] (emphasis added).  This argument merely restates in the 
"personal injury" context the majority's unfounded emphasis on 
sexual conduct.  There is no express mention whatsoever in the 
STDE of "conduct" or "sexual conduct" in any context. 
         A straightforward comparison of the STDE and the claim 
in this case is instructive on this point.  The STDE excludes 
claims for personal injury (i.e., defamation or defamation 
leading to invasion of privacy) "arising directly or indirectly 
out of instances, occurrences or allegations involving sexually 
transmitted diseases, including Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome (AIDS)."  In this case, Silverman nicked his finger on a 
gym locker and was wearing a band-aid when he was confronted by 
Guzzardi.  Guzzardi allegedly exclaimed that Silverman was 
careless and "could infect everybody."  Based upon Guzzardi's 
outburst, Silverman alleges a number of causes of action that 
could be characterized as personal injury under the policy.  
Silverman's claims for personal injury arise directly from 
Guzzardi's allegation that Silverman might transmit AIDS in the 
Gym. 
         Under any reasonable interpretation of the word 
"involving," Guzzardi's allegation involves a sexually 
transmitted disease and fear of its possible transmission.  
Silverman's claim arises directly from Guzzardi's utterance, 
which makes explicit reference to Silverman's AIDS and the 
possibility that he could infect others.  Under the majority's 
interpretation, Guzzardi's exclamation would apparently have to 
include some additional reference to sexual conduct.  Given the 
broad language of the STDE, I find that such a narrow reading of 
its coverage is implausible. 
         Finally, the majority argues that the language of the 
STDE "does not reveal a clear nexus between a claim and a 
sexually transmitted disease."  Slip op. at    [Typescript at 
18].  The majority is troubled by the STDE's purported failure to 
define an appropriate nexus because "the distinction between a 
'remote' connection and an 'incidental' connection to a sexually 
transmitted disease may be significant in this case."  I 
disagree.  The broadly-worded STDE excludes personal injury from 
coverage even if the injury arose only "indirectly" from an 
occurrence or allegation "involving" sexually transmitted 
diseases, such as AIDS.  In this case, the entire sum and 
substance of Guzzardi's allegedly injurious remarks involved 
AIDS, Silverman's status as an individuals with AIDS, and the 
potential that Silverman could infect others in the Gym with 
AIDS.  We could, perhaps, imagine a claim on the margin of 
coverage where the alleged ambiguity surrounding the word 
"involving" might come into play.  Nevertheless, if the exclusion 
applies to "personal injury" at all (which it clearly does), this 
case is in the heartland of those cases that the STDE excludes 
from coverage. 
         In the course of its opinion, the majority acknowledges 
that its interpretation of the STDE is motivated to some extent 
by a reluctance to carry the STDE to its logical extension.  The 
majority correctly states that the STDE might potentially 
eliminate coverage "for an extremely broad set of claims."  Slip 
op. at    [Typescript at 18].  There is no reason to assume, 
however, that the parties did not appreciate the full import of 
their agreement when they signed it.  In fact, it is highly 
unlikely that General Star and the Gym agreed to the STDE without 
considering just the sort of claim presented in this case.  
Before the parties agreed to the STDE, a number of courts had 
awarded damages and/or non-monetary relief to HIV-positive or 
AIDS-infected individuals who were illegally excluded from public 
accommodations or employment.  Some of these cases awarded 
damages for associated emotional pain and mental anguish. 
         The issue presented in this case was of obvious 
importance to both parties.  The Gym estimates that approximately 
sixty percent of its members, both male and female, are gay, and 
that "of the gay population, approximately ten to twelve percent 
(10-12%) of the membership were either HIV positive or had AIDS 
in March of 1994."  Appellees' Brief at 11.  Given the existing 
case law on the topic and the importance of the issue for the Gym 
and for General Star, I see no reason to suppose that the parties 
did not consider the implications of the broad language employed 
in the STDE.  We should feel no compunction about holding the Gym 
to the bargain that it struck. 
         The majority's identification of an ambiguity in the 
STDE relies heavily on a tortured construction of the term 
"sexually transmitted disease" to require actual sexual conduct.  
This narrow interpretation of a key term ignores the normal usage 
of the words as well as the context in which they are used in the 
STDE.  The underlying claims that give rise to the Gym's only 
valid claim for indemnification hinge on remarks permeated with 
references to Silverman's AIDS.  Therefore, I would reverse the 
district court's decision in favor of the Gym, and I would remand 
this case to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of 
General Star. 
 
